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INTRODUCTION
Innovations and R&D play really crucial role in
the processes of economic development in the
modern world. At the macrolevel their exact
contribution to the economic development is
difficult to assess [1] but, anyway, it recognizes
widely by the absolute majority of economists
[2].
At the microlevel, innovations lead to a
number of positive results, including higher pro!
ductivity, entering the new markets, higher
quality of production and etc. Unfortunately,
theorists of transition process pay no enough
attention to the innovative component of eco!
nomic transformation, focusing mainly on insti!
tutional and organizational aspects of changes
in Central and Eastern European (CEE) coun!
tries [3, 4].   
At the same time, it is evident that without
proper understanding of the role of innovations
and R&D it would not be possible to evolve a
balanced view of the processes of transition and
to make a reliable forecast for the further devel!
opment of the CEE countries. 
Unfortunately, in many countries of the
region governments, as well as industrial lead!
ers, have no clear understanding of significance
of innovations and new technologies in restruc!
turing process, when state policy stimulates
development of the technologically advanced
sectors with higher than average level of value!
added. In many CEE countries innovation poli!
cy and transformation of R&D system has not
been in the focus of local governments. As a
result, transformations of these important com!
ponents of modern economic system was rather
'chaotic' and in some cases not rational in early
1990s. Later, the attitude to the S&T policy has
been changed but loses of the early transition
period was difficult to compensate in late 1990s!
early 2000s.   
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EXPANSION OF NEW SECTORS 
AND INNOVATIONS AS MEANS 
OF ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING
Economic restructuring involves actions by
enterprise to bridge the gap between current
performance and what is required in order to
become internationally competitive. These gaps
emerge as a result of global changes in technol!
ogy, organization, marketing, and factor prices.
Industry, in turn, is prompted by policy, regula!
tory and institutional changes to improve its
competitiveness [5]. Generally speaking,
restructuring is successful, when a firm or an
industry has shifted to a product mix and cost
structure that is competitive and – that is very
important – positioned to remain competitive.
This could be provided by active innovations
and permanent introduction of new products in
the international and local markets. At macro
level, innovations usually lead to positive
changes in the industrial structure, when the
shares of modern, technologically sophisticated
industries are growing faster that the shares of
other industries. This process is accompanied
with accelerated growth of companies' profits
and diversification of industrial production. 
In all industrialized nations the long!term
growth of business and, thus, of nations, stems
from their ability to develop and produce inno!
vative products permanently. As Freeman
argues, "not to innovate is to die" [6, p. 266]. 
In 1990s – beginning of 2000s, dynamics of
industrial development in Central European
and post!Soviet countries were controversial
and unstable. In late 1980s – 1990s, all coun!
tries of the region have passed through a diffi!
cult period of recession, but the time of this
recession and depth of economic decline were
different. Central European economies have
adjusted relatively quickly to the new realities,
while in the post!Soviet states crisis has contin!
ued for a decade and GDP shrunk by several
times in the case of Transcaucasian states, some
Central Asian countries, Moldova and Ukraine.
In a recovery phase, some countries, like Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Estonia had
growth rates of industrial development, that
was higher than corresponding growth rates of
GDP. In some other countries, like Latvia,
Slovakia and Lithuania situation was just the
opposite. As to the industrial growth itself,
there is no universal trend towards slower
growth rate in the region. The only conclusion
could be made is that slower growth is charac!
teristic of more advanced countries of the region
with higher per capita incomes. 
The economic slump has led to significant
structural changes in the CEE economies. The
share of industry, especially the share of manu!
facturing sectors, dropped significantly, while
the share of services grew steadily. In parallel, all
transition economies have experienced consid!
erable loses of working places in industrial sec!
tor, especially in some high tech industries. 
Structural changes in macro level of the
national economies were accompanied by the
changes within industries themselves. In all
transition economies, excluding Hungary and
Slovenia, the share of manufacturing declined
significantly, while the shares of energy sector
and heavy industries had tendencies to grow.    
Central European countries and especially
countries, which have become new EU members
in 2004, have actively transformed their
economies to adjust them to the common EU
market. Some of them, like Czech Republic,
Estonia and Hungary have attracted substantial
amounts of FDI. Many companies in these
countries have become specialized subcontrac!
tors or subsidiaries of leading foreign firms.
Western European, American, South Korean
and Japanese companies have brought new
technologies and helped their Eastern European
partners to enter the new markets. Usually,
partnership with foreign firms forces Eastern
European companies to undertake more active
restructuring policy, than they do without it [7].
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The share of internationally competitive goods
and services, delivered by these companies has
robust tendency to grow. 
In mid!1990s Central European countries
started transformation of their Soviet!type sci!
entific systems into modern innovation systems,
similar to innovation systems of developed
countries. 
This process was accompanied with sub!
stantial changes in R&D activities, which were
reflected in dynamics of key indicators (see
table 1).
As it is shown in the table 1, majority of
CEE countries could not reach the pre!reform
level of 1990s. At the same time, it is evident the
dynamics of the recent years is mainly positive.
But the R&D expenses per capita are still 2–15
times lower in the CEE, than in Western
Europe. The figures for the number of
researchers per thousand of total employment
has similar dynamics but here the difference
with Western countries is much smaller 1.5–2
times, and some countries, notably ! Slovenia,
have volumes of this indicator that are even
higher than the average figure for the EU. This
means that expenses per researcher in CEE are
much lower than in the EU.      
The share of financing from business sector
in Central and Eastern European countries is
also lower than 50 %, that is less than in the EU
(with the exception of Czech Republic), but
usually it is higher than in the less developed
EU countries of Southern Europe.    
In 1990s, a number of concepts of national
innovation systems were evolved [8, 9] to open
the way for complex studies of the industrial
and S&T systems in different countries. These
concepts contain so!called "stylized facts", that
are common for description of all innovation
systems. For instance, in this context the own!
ership advantage of the firm (technology, brand,
marketing, managerial skills) may be treated as
specific assets. But the primary economic 'func!
tion' of innovations is to gain advantages in
competition and, as a result, to higher profits
and stronger positions in the markets. But
short!term profit growth is not the primary goal
for any advanced company. Innovation system is
liable to be socially embedded in such a way
that that the innovativeness of individual firms
will be influenced by socially specific, and extra
organizational factors, such as infrastructure of
financial institutions, labour markets and provi!
sion of workforce training, mechanisms govern!
ing the support of business start!ups and devel!
opment, attitudes and policy concerned with
science and technology and the potency of per!
vasiveness of inter!firm and firm!institutional
Table 1. Gross domestic expenditures on R&D in selected CEE countries (million USD, current prices, recalculated
in accordance with Purchasing Parity Powers (PPP) of the national currencies), compiled from OECD Main S&T
Indicators, Vol.  2004/2, Paris, OECD, p. 19 and 57
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interaction [10]. It is widely recognized that
technological innovations are playing really
crucial role in modern economic development.
For a number of economists the level of techno!
logical competence of a given country is seen as
a basic factor constraining productivity of its
industrial sector, with technological advance
the central driving force behind economic
growth [11]. In this context 'institutions' are
considered as moulding the technologies used
by a society, and technological change itself. It is
even possible to conclude that, to some extent,
the influence of country's institutions on its
ability to master and advance technology is a
central way institutions affect economic per!
formance. 
Internationalization of production in mod!
ern economy calls for competitive strategies
that are coherent in the face of powerfully sup!
ported international rivals, and generally
requires reliable allies. This also requires cre!
ation of equal opportunities for different compa!
nies from the side of the state, as well as support
of innovative companies are key precondition
for successful restructuring and further devel!
opment. 
Economic restructuring is a permanent
process, and innovations are playing a crucial
role in it. Every company makes its individual
decisions about introduction or non!introduc!
tion of innovations. On the other hand, within
the new conceptions of techno!economic devel!
opment innovation process could not be under!
stood as the outcome of independent decision!
making at the level of the firms but rather must
be viewed as an interactive, cumulative and
cooperative phenomenon, which incorporates
more than simple phased multilateral or bilater!
al interactions between the users, industry and
the science base. Successful development of new
technologically advanced sectors in Ireland and
Finland in recent years gives an important
example of how to 'orchestrate' the process of
restructuring.  
ENHANCING COMPETITIVENESS
THROUGH INTRODUCTION OF NEW
TECHNOLOGIES
Introduction of new technologies and growth of
competitiveness are interrelated processes. It is
difficult to determine these connections quanti!
tatively in terms of reasons and results. At the
firm level, final success depends not purely on
'technological' factors but also on organization!
al framework of the company, situation in the
market, sector specificity and so on. In general,
higher innovativeness is associated with higher
competitiveness. So, in recent years the shares
of innovative enterprises in CEE countries were
between 6 % and 20 %, while in Poland –
between 30 % and 50 %, and in the countries of
the European Union average share was around
60 %–70 %.  These figures correlate with all
major indexes of competitiveness for national
economies [12].     
But, again, the level of innovativeness could
not be itself an indicator of commercial success.
A high frequency of innovative activities in the
early period of restructuring reflect intensive
'searching' activities of enterprises that tried to
enter new markets with new products or tech!
nologies. As a part of their diversification
efforts, enterprises are launching new products,
which later have to be withdrawn from the mar!
ket in a number of cases due to their marketing,
high costs or quality problems. The pure techni!
cal novelty is very often insufficient for com!
mercialization. So, innovation is an important
precondition, not guarantee for commercial suc!
cess. 
Central European countries are re!integrat!
ing into world economy on the base of so!called
foreign – led modernization, when technology
transfer and innovation processes are strongly
shaped by the strategies of multinational corpo!
rations (MNC) and WTO!based international
trade regimes. Deep involvement of foreign cap!
ital and management into processes of restruc!
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turing determine directions of innovation policy
in these countries. A lot of enterprises in the
region are included into MNC production
chains and use their technological expertise.
Hungary, probably gives the most vivid example
of such interaction: more that three quarters of
Hungarian industry belongs to foreign owners.
Average level of productivity in these enterpris!
es is two times higher that in the 'purely'
Hungarian firms. Companies, controlled by for!
eigners, provide more than 80% of industrial
export. 
Another important tendency in Central
European countries is a growing specialization
of their economies. At the same time, economies
of the most advanced countries of the region
(Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic) have expe!
rienced a less dramatic reinforcement of produc!
tion patterns based on their inter!industry spe!
cialisation, and much more on intra!industry
specialisation. In the countries of Central
Europe, after a decade and a half of institution!
al transition the relevant issue for the long!term
growth and competitiveness is whether or not
integration into MNCs structures is pushing
these economies towards long!term growth
based on innovation and permanent industrial
upgrading. This is not an easy question, as cho!
sen model of development reduces scope for
autonomous actions and makes these countries
extremely dependent on foreign markets, capi!
tal, know!how and even organizational capabil!
ities. 
The situation is different in the post!Soviet
states. They use mainly model of domestic!led
modernization, while main assets still belong to
national firms. But even such rich in natural
resources countries, as Russia could hardly
expect any fast restructuring of such sectors as
automotive industry or telecom without inflow
of foreign capital, innovations and management.
Russian situation is specific, as the country has
vast natural resources. Russian specialization in
natural resources could lead to the typical 'lock!
in' situation. As some experimental studies
show, in general, growth based on increased spe!
cialization in export ultimately needs to be com!
plemented by an increased product variety.
Long!term growth rests on complementary rela!
tionships between scale and scope. An increased
variety of products is subsequently followed by
enhancements of specialization in those prod!
ucts proven to be competitive in external
and/or internal markets [13].  
In conditions of growing role of knowledge
in modern economy, companies are modifying
their businesses with the aim to increase 'intel!
lectual' components in their businesses. In gen!
eral, intellectual assets are playing a growing
role in production processes, especially in hi!
tech sectors. Mass!production is combined with
individual client!oriented approach. Not pro!
duction itself only but provision of specific serv!
ices has become a usual practice for a number of
companies. Electronic devices have become part
and parcel of many traditional goods. In some
sectors companies, which produce so!called
'large systems', such as airplanes, companies
have to co!ordinate their efforts with thousands
of subcontractors. All this requires new techni!
cal skills and managerial capabilities for success!
ful development. Modern firms require substan!
tial in!house capacity to recognize, evaluate,
negotiate, and finally adapt the technology
potentially available from different sources. As
authors of the seminal work on 'absorptive
capacity' showed, it is increased by doing one's
own R&D, even if much of that appears to be
'imitative' [14]. Failure to conduct research
within enterprises not only leads to incorrect
choices but restricts the ability to make modifi!
cations to the technology that may be essential
to market success. Von Tunzelman stresses this
very important problem of the CEE countries
[15]. Under transition, most of these countries
have seen a collapse of R&D measured at the
national level, and particularly a collapse of
business expenditure on R&D. This implies a
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national weakening of the ability to imitate and
modify technologies. A new dependence on EU
and global sources of technology has emerged !
MNCs are being entrusted to bring in new tech!
nology through FDI and management. 'While
that is well and good as a way of overcoming
short!term deficiencies, it is not a sustainable
basis for long!term development. We have thus
witnessed a disintegration of alarming propor!
tions of 'national system of innovation' in the
CEE countries since 1989' [16, p.19]. The total
share of the CEE countries in the world patent
is much lower than the share of 'average' EU
country (see table 2). 
Almost all CEE countries have highly neg!
ative technology balance of payments. It is not
surprising, but the problem is the figures of
technology exchange are much lower than in
neighbouring Western European countries. To
some extent this could be explained by the fact
that MNCs could conduct technology transfer
to their subsidiaries through internal channels.
This also means that national companies are not
very active in innovation sphere. This could be
also confirmed by the data from national inno!
vation surveys in CEE countries.   
The relative degradation of national inno!
vation systems further reduces the attractive!
ness of these countries to its bright and compe!
tent prospective young talent. This is clearly a
major social problem in the countries that most
suffer from it, and one that will have long!term
effects on economic growth and techno!eco!
nomic development.             
In the socialist economy, innovation process
was hierarchically organized with much
stronger linkages on vertical levels that on hor!
izontal ones. Different elements of innovation
cycles were located within the different hierar!
chies. The absolute majority of innovation proj!
ects was carried out within the Academy of
Sciences, some military!industrial complex
institutes and the Universities, while develop!
ment work was fragmented among other sectors
(branch institutes, large enterprises and so on).
The actual design of new production lines was
carried out by organizations normally subordi!
nate to the industrial ministries, or in some
cases to the central planning authorities.
Economic development was strictly oriented on
expansion, and several types of techno!econom!
ic systems co!exited in the Soviet!type industry
at the same moment. In practice, this means that
due to expansion targets, it was really difficult
to stop production to re!equip any more or less
important factories. In conditions of a closed,
centrally planned economy, only the military
sector had to compete with foreign producers,
but in most of the cases not on the basis of cost!
efficiency principles. At the end, even military !
industrial complex has started to suffer from
declining standards in the rest of the economy.
A lot of enterprises from the advanced sec!
tors in the Central European and the post!
Soviet states have stopped their production in
the period of crisis. But there are still some
reserves for development in high!tech sectors in
these countries. In fact, most of previously inde!
pendent Eastern European firms have become
parts of large MNCs (Videoton in Hungary,
Scoda – in Czech Republic) or were converted
into smaller service companies (Izot – in
Table 2. Shares of selected CEE countries in 'triadic'
patent families (priority year), %,  compiled from OECD
Main S&T Indicators, Vol.  2004/2, Paris, OECD, p. 51
and 57 
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Bulgaria). Some companies have become effec!
tive specialized suppliers to Western firms.
These companies are generally small, and pro!
vide high performance inputs into complex sys!
tems of production and of information process!
ing, in the form of machinery, components,
instruments or software. Technological accumu!
lation takes place through the design, building
and operational use of these production inputs.
To some extent, even large companies from the
region could be considered as specialized suppli!
ers. In this case, all participants preserve their
independence, but pooling financial and intel!
lectual resources into specific project. 
Another group of companies are operating
as subcontractors in some projects. In this case,
Western partner establishes its own standards
for inputs and exerts control over the quality of
supplies. In the process of cooperation Eastern
partner usually receives access to limited num!
ber of technologies and know!how. In many
cases, organization of new forms of cooperation
between Western and Eastern enterprises has
'asymmetric' nature, as Western partner, as a
rule, has more different resources and takes the
lead in such alliances.     
At the same time, it is also important to
mention that research institutes and design
bureaus in the CEE countries contain the
results of R&D, which represent a potential of
billions of dollars in commercial value. But
technologies for domestic development and
technologies and products ready for competi!
tion in the world market are different things.
Anyway, there is a potential opportunity for
establishing more 'balanced' relations with
Western partners in these cases.
Some leading research institutes have
already transformed themselves into research!
production companies, with preservation of
some R&D and creation a dozens of spin!offs
that are doing business, including production of
goods, on the base of former institutes. Such
examples are relatively numerous among tech!
nology!oriented institutes in the post!Soviet
states. But very often these companies could not
overcome relatively high entry barriers that
exist in foreign markets, especially in developed
countries. Costs related to patenting, marketing
and dissemination of their products appear
unacceptable in many cases. So, they are moving
to the emerging markets of South!East Asian
countries, Arab states and some other regions.
But such strategy could not be considered as a
long!term one. Situation in the lowest segments
of the market is usually strain and unstable. To
be competitive companies have to try to enter
the largest and the most sophisticated markets.  
SMES AND INNOVATION 
Some hopes are connected with creation of
small and medium!sized private innovative
companies as an alternative to awkward giants
of the socialist economy. In some countries small
enterprises have started to play important role
in the process of transformation of national
R&D systems into national innovation systems.
They not only absorb a part of workforce from
the large restructured enterprises, but some of
them – TSMEs (technology!based SMEs)
could also contribute significantly to creation of
corresponding technological capabilities in the
economy [17]. 
Their potential success is linked to hard!to!
value growth potential derived from scientific
knowledge and intellectual property. At the
same time, it is evident that in the early stages of
their life cycle, they lack tangible assets that
may be used as collateral. In addition to this,
their products have little or no track record, are
largely untested in markets, and very often have
high obsolescence rates. 
That is why in transition countries TSMEs
have a number of problems with obtaining
financial resources for their development. 
Friends and families are the most important
sources of finance for new firms in all transition
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countries. In Northern America, some countries
of Western Europe, notably in England, 'net!
works of angels investors ' are capable of pooling
relatively large sums to finance the TSMEs.
These networks include successful entrepre!
neurs and corporate executives, and thus are
able to provide other forms of assistance.
Important role in the success of TSMEs could
be explained by a number of factors but the key
of them could be summarised in the following
way: 
– strong entrepreneurial culture;
– strong university!based research with links
to private sector – S&T clusters, especially
in California and Massachusetts;
– well!developed equity market;
– important role of government both indirect
and direct, including provision of tax bene!
fits and so on.   
But in Eastern European countries these
networks are underdeveloped and still have no
serious impact on TSMEs development. The
share of venture capital was slightly higher than
0.1 % of GDP in Poland and Czech Republic in
late 1990s – early 2000s, and even lower in
other Сentral European states, while in the
USA the meaning of this indicators reached
0.63 % and in the UK and Ireland it was at the
level of 0.7 %–0.8 % of GDP. 
Transition countries need much more insti!
tutions that would have potential to finance
TSMEs. These institutions have to accept high
level of risks for high potential profits and the
same time, they will not require collateral, nor
charge interest payments. It would be also
important to provide not only short!term, but
also long!term and at least medium term loans
and to contribute to the management of the
firm. 
As to the business environment, it is very
useful to create conditions, where entrepreneurs
will be willing to sell significant equity to out!
siders and also willing either to be acquired or to
participate in public offerings. Labour market
has to be sufficiently flexible, as top quality
managers and technologists will be available to
staff growing firms.  
It seems that at the current stage of devel!
opment, it would be extremely difficult to
obtain financing for TSMEs from private
sources in transition countries. As Hall noted
[18], there is fairly clear evidence, based on the!
ory, surveys, and empirical estimations, that
small and start!up firms in R&D! intensive
industries face a higher cost of capital than their
larger competitors and than firms in other
industries. 
That is why the state has to play more
active role in stimulating creation and develop!
ment of TSMEs in transition countries. In some
cases, even such mechanisms as long!gestation
projects, involving basic research with the state
support could be justified. There is a plethora of
different types of incentives that governments
have used, including financial and fiscal incen!
tives, direct lending programmes and so on in
Western countries. The problem lies in choosing
right combination of these incentives, as gov!
ernment involvement easily creates market dis!
tortions, cause problems of moral hazard and
adverse selection.
In the some Eastern European states these
mechanisms for supporting TSMEs are under!
developed and they are often used in a pervasive
way. It is evident that new high!tech companies
need better access to financial resources.
Removing serious distortions in the financial
sector is a prerequisite for the start and success!
ful development of new businesses. In theory,
sound new investments can take place only after
the restructuring of enterprises, that supply key
intermediary products and only after non!per!
forming assets have been dealt with explicitly.
Otherwise, banks will bail out unhealthy invest!
ments, raising financial costs and pushing aside
healthy new prospects. To improve the financial
health and the efficiency of banking system,
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governments must introduce regulatory incen!
tives and restructure the finances of affected
intermediaries [19]. 
Industrial regulations cover an array of reg!
ulations that govern commercial operations, of
which the most relevant are those that deter
competition, including barriers to entry, exit
and expansion.
Typically entry barriers protect dominant
local enterprises. Policies designed to foster
infant industries often ossify into protection for
monopolies or oligopolies. Such progressive
rigidities can be the by!product of import!sub!
stitution strategies, with governments and firms
co!operating to make domestic production
capacity equal domestic demand. Entry barriers
protect incumbent enterprises in domestic mar!
kets from challenge of new entrants. As a result,
the gap in competitiveness widens between
firms operating in the world market and enter!
prises operating in protected sub!sectors. But in
many cases, it is possible to establish some kind
of transitional period for particular enterprises
under a strict state control to adjust their man!
agerial and production systems to a changed
environment. Shock from immediate entry to
the market from centrally!planned system have
destroyed a number of potentially profitable
enterprises.   
In any case, it is evident to keep pace with
advanced countries, the process of creation of
the new technology!oriented companies has to
be accelerated in Eastern Europe [20]. At the
end, it does not matter whether industrial enter!
prises absorb R&D laboratories or research
institutions buy factories: the important point is
that they have to be integrated. In!house indus!
trial research, most of which is closely linked to
the production process, is the cornerstone for
successful restructuring of the national
economies [21].
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CEE 
AND 'OLD' EU COUNTRIES
The gap between the industrial and research
sectors inherited from the socialist period is still
substantial, and only development of new tech!
nology!oriented businesses could help to reduce
it. 
As Radosevic stresses, during the 1990s, the
main source of technology was via imports of
capital goods and foreign direct investment.
Endogenously generated R&D and technology
played a marginal role in the industrial upgrad!
ing of the CEE countries. The current patterns
of industrial upgrading, which are most often
led by foreign enterprises, will eventually reach
their limits without domestically generated
R&D and new technologies [22].      
In the most concentrated form the differ!
ence between developed Western European
countries and the EU could be shown in the dif!
ference in the values of the EU benchmarking
indicators, presented in the EU innovation
scoreboard. 
EU innovation scoreboard (EIS) is a com!
posite indicator that uses dozen and a half indi!
cators to proxy R&D and innovation activities.
In the table 3 these indicators for selected CEE
countries in 2002 are presented.      
This is not surprising that these countries
are behind the technology frontier and that the
majority of their technological activities are
focused on absorption and importation of new
technologies. CEE have relatively high posi!
tions if consider "human capital category" and
worse in positions in almost all other categories. 
Unfortunately, limited data availability of
trend values for individual EIS categories do
not allow to analyse whether there is the ten!
dency of catching!up or falling behind in all
directions. However, it would be wrong to con!
clude that technology effort has not been taking
place in these economies. Relatively high quali!
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Table 3. EU benchmarking innovation indicators for selected CEE countries, 2001 (adopted from Towards a European
Research Area: Key Figures 2002. Special edition. – European Communities, 2001, Luxembourg, 73p)
40
Special Issue
SCIENCE  AND  INNOVATION. N 4, 2005
ty of human capital is the key precondition for
convergence between the CEE and the rest of
the EU. 
Using the data from the latest EIS surveys,
Wintjes and Dunnewijk [23] showed, that the
distance between the new members and two
candidate countries (Bulgaria and Romania),
on the one hand, and the old EU members, on
other, is declining (see table 4). 
Innovation trend show how innovation
index changes over the time. In recent years the
growth rate of innovation activities in CEE was
almost three times higher than the average for
EU!15 but these countries still perform two
times worse than old EU members. The differ!
ence between the EU leaders in innovation pol!
icy and CEE is even greater.      
In 2004, EU Commission recommended its
new member states to make substantial efforts
aimed at intensification of R&D and innova!
tions. Key reasons for such recommendation
were: low investment in R&D and innovation
and retraining activities, low efficiency of edu!
cation system and vocational training, and in
the case of Slovenia and Czech Republic low
efficiency of R&D and innovation.
Recommendations to increase investments in
business R&D and in vocational training stand
as prominent mechanism to increase productiv!
ity for all new member states [24].    
CONCLUSION
Central and Eastern European countries have
made great steps on their integration into
European structures but their attempts to reach
higher level of economic development are seri!
ously affected by the lack of attention to the
problem of innovation and the effective utiliza!
tion of the results of national R&D system.    
Experience of different countries demon!
strate that economic restructuring can be effec!
tive only as complements to policies that pro!
mote efficient responses by most firms at the
economy or at least at targeted industries.
Technology transfer and innovations have to
play growing roles in successful restructuring,
as the modern technologies and know!how pro!
vide higher value!added and substantial advan!
tages in front of the competitors. 
Bearing in mind rapid changes in technolo!
gy and markets and the increasing focus on
exports, banks, private venture funds and state
organizations have to develop specific expertise
in project evaluation. Existing technologies and
know!how could be commercialized, and bring
substantial dividends to the countries in transi!
tion. At the same time, technology transfer from
the West could help to solve not purely eco!
nomic, but in some cases, also environmental
and social problems, from which countries of the
region are still suffering.
Table 4. Indication of Knowledge Kbased Economy in North, South and CentralKEast EU, unweighted averages, 2003
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Technologies, innovation management and technology transfer
A common feature of the CEE countries is
relatively weak and disorganized constituency
in favour of innovation policy and innovation
activities. Despite positive dynamics in recent
years, these countries need serious reinforce!
ment of their efforts, aimed at the gaining the
level of developed Western states.    
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